Rachel Chaltry

Composition and Rhetoric 102

April 2, 2004

The United State’s concern with North Korea

As a result of the events of September 11 2001, many Americans have shifted their focus to the Middle East and may have forgotten, for the time being, about the other problems with which America is currently involved.  One of these problems is North Korea and the possible threat it poses of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.  The United States is especially concerned with the fact that at the celebration of the 55^th anniversary of North Korea’s communist government it was declared, “The North has every right to produce and test nuclear weapons” (Kirk 9).  Many people feel that the United States government has no business regulating weapon systems, and a way of life that does not directly pertain to them.  The South Korean populous especially holds this view.  However, the main reason our government is looking into North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction is to protect us from what may come in the future.  As I began the research for this paper, I never fully understood what the United States government meant when they claim, “this is for the good of the country”.  We are told that although we may be overstepping our boundaries and rights in attempting to regulate other countries’ policies, the government is trying to protect our people and the way of life that we have developed.  However, I still feel that this explanation does not justify our prowling into other countries’ affairs and telling them how to act, react, and protect themselves from the threats of the world, including the threat we pose to them.

The relationship between the United States and South Korea is going through a very difficult time.  The high amount of antipathy felt by South Koreans toward the United States, the weak government of President Roh Moo Hyun, and the lack of public support for the United States military action against North Korea from the South, makes it more difficult for the White House to “defuse this time bomb” (Stokes 1).  This lack of support creates problems for the troops that are stationed in South Korea.  There are “37,000” troops stationed in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the North and the South (Cha and Kang 24).  “The balance of power has held because any war would have disastrous consequences for both sides.”  In addition, the U.S. forces have at their disposal “nuclear-tipped Lance missiles…nuclear-capable airbases and naval facilities” in case of any conflict with North Korea (Cha and Kang 24).  Many South Koreans, especially the young, feel that “North Korea is no longer seen as a threat.  It is a failed state.  Not an aggressor” says Kim Kyun Won of the Seoul Forum (Stokes 4).  “Only a minority of the public believes that North Korea would actually attack South Korea.  [The] majority sees the North’s nuclear weapons program as purely defensive in nature.  Most South Koreans do not believe North Korea will use Nuclear weapons on Korean territory” (Stokes 4). Because of this, many South Koreans want the troops of American soldiers to leave South Korea; their purpose there is no longer valid. 

Since the Clinton administration in 1998, the United States has been “trying to persuade North Korea to give U.S. inspectors access to a suspected underground nuclear site at Keumjang-ri.  Pyongyang [wanted] 300 million dollars and a formal apology as the [for the United States governments’] price for visiting Keumjang-ri” (Strobel 1).  The United States has been concerned with North Korea’s possible nuclear weapons for some time.  President Bush is now continuing President Clintons’ work in trying to disarm North Korea.  However, Bush has taken some wrong turns in the process.  In the 2002 State of the Union speech, Bush labeled North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil”, but this was an unfair categorization on his part.  “Iran, Iraq, and North Korea do share some common traits, the main one being an adversarial relationship with the United States.  They are also authoritarian, have allegedly supported or sponsored terrorism, and have programs to develop weapons of mass destruction” (Cha and Kang 20).  Bush worries about North Korea selling missile technology to Iran, but they also sell these same technologies to our allies, Pakistan and Egypt.    How is it that he can develop a decision of where they can sell their technologies and where they cannot?  Bush’s main goal in labeling North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil” may be to fire up the Americans that do not necessarily support the conflicts and convince them to allow more financial support for Bush’s programs.  Many believe we should have no say in North Korea’s export of goods and their sources of income.  “North Korea has not engaged in terrorism in the last 16 years, and there has never been any link, nor [have] any [been] suggested, between North Korea and al Qaeda” (Cha and Kang 20). 

Many people in the United States believe that Clintons’ administration’s policies toward North Korea failed.  However, many good things came out of Clintons’ time as president.  “Previously [before the Clinton administration], the United States had little sense of the North’s interest in swapping its proliferation threat for external assistance” (Cha and Kang 24).  Clinton has also been able to increase the contact with North Korea and other countries. “Since 1994, the North has gained food, fuel, economic assistance, and diplomatic relations not just with South Korea but also Japan, the European Union, Australia, Canada, and others” (Cha and Kang 24-26).  Unfortunately, Bush has taken the progress that Clinton had procured and destroyed the trust gained with North Korea by following “a harder-line policy by threatening to withhold what was once previously promised” (Cha and Kang 26).  However, Bush cannot be blamed for the current crisis, either.  “As far back as 1997, Pakistani nuclear scientists were shuttling to Pyongyang, providing technology for uranium enrichment in return for North Korean missile systems” (Cha and Kang 26).  It is the current belief of the Whitehouse that “North Korea stands so far outside the non-proliferation regime that negotiating its return would be tantamount to blackmail.  Should Pyongyang first make compliance gestures, however, then the United States would be willing to discuss incentives including security assurance, energy, and economic assistance” (Cha and Kang 26).

A recent serious concern was the 55^th anniversary of the communist government.  This recently occurred in September 2003.  “Many people were surprised with the low-key celebration” (Kirk 9) that took place on this momentous occasion.  The people in the South were expecting a display of a new missile or the launching of one “over Japan [and] into the pacific” to display their “defiance of Japan and the United States” (Kirk 9).  The United States still recalled the “invasion of the southern, American controlled country” (Weigley) at the beginning of the Korean War.  They were greatly concerned with the possibility of another dramatic move from the communist government.  Fortunately, a drastic display of power did not take place. Though we can put a rest to the fears of the celebration, there are many other factors that are presenting problems.  There have been many meetings to discuss the nonproliferation policies of the United States.  At the meeting in Beijing involving North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and the United States, the North Koreans boasted, “its membership in the club of nuclear powers was imminent and inevitable” (Kirk 9).  Due to the lack of cooperation from North Korea, the United States refused to supply the technology that was to be used in the “twin light water nuclear reactors at Kumho” even though this facility would have greatly aided the energy problem in North Korea. (Kirk 10)  “Once North Korea expelled the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors at the end of last year, re-fired its Yongbyon reactor, and started removing fuel rods from the cooling pond, the nuclear stand off escalated to the crisis level.  Pyongyang fanned the flames by broadcasting that it was proceeding with the development of a plutonium warhead” (Kirk 10).  “Pyongyang paired direct dialogue with a call early [in 2003] for a U.S.-North Korean nonaggression pact” which would prevent the U.S. from launching a “pre-emptive strike” towards North Korea.  However, “it is fully aware that the very notion of a nonaggression pact has been in ill repute” “since the eve of WWII” (Kirk 11).  Even so, the North Koreans “will continue to demand a nonaggression pact” but since the United States officials have already ruled this option out, they “will settle for a face-saving ‘guarantee’ of security despite [the] 37,000 U.S. troops” training in the DMZ. (Kirk 9)

The United States has claimed “that it can discuss the issue of the DPRK’s concerns only when the latter takes a practical action to physically dismantle the ‘nuclear weapons program’ in a verifiable and irreversible manner” (KCNA Refutes U.S. Brigands Demand). This took place at the meeting in Beijing.  “The DPRK does not have any obligation to be subject to such verification under law as it has done its utmost for world’s peace and stability.  Moreover, the U.S. has no justification to bring up this issue as it spawned the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. and sparked nuclear confrontation between them.”  “It is the U.S. that compelled the DPRK to build up a nuclear deterrent force” to begin with. (KCNA Refutes U.S. Brigandish Demand)  “It must be reemphasized that the verification issue might be discussed only after the U.S. drops its hostile policy toward the DPRK and the U.S. total removal of its nuclear threat to the DPRK is confirmed.”  (KCNA Refutes U.S. Brigandish Demand)  As the fighting between the two governments takes place, both sides will have to give some of what the other wants in order to end this conflict and bring the crisis level down to a manageable level.

“The DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) will continue to increase its nuclear deterrent force as a means for self-defense in order to defend the sovereignty of the country as the United States has not yet shown its will to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK despite the DPRK’s good faith and magnanimity” said Kim Yong Chun.  “He stated that the Korean People’s Army will unite close with the people and foil the moves of the U.S. imperialists to isolate and stifle the DPRK from the toughest stand.  If they ignite another war in this land, the Korean army and people will deal merciless crushing blows at them and achieve the historical cause of national reunification without fail.” (DPRK to Steadily Increase Its Nuclear Deterrent Force)  It seems that both the north and the south peninsulas of Korea are looking to come back together.  “Many South Koreans see Bush’s vilification of North Korea as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ as a road block to eventual unification of the peninsula, a strongly held national ambition.” “People constantly refer to Koreans as ‘one race’.  Kim Tae Sun from Dongguk University said ‘We regard North Korea as the same nation’” (Stokes 4).  It seems like the United States is blocking this progress, however, the government has to protect their interests before they can pull out of South Korea and leave the nations to settle things between themselves. 

The United States, South Korea, and North Korea are all having difficulties on the Korean peninsula.  The United States is trying to protect itself from any threats from North Korea and their nuclear weapons, which have not yet been confirmed.  Because these weapons are unconfirmed, the U.S. is diligently searching for any proof that will aid us in confirming that the weapons are or not definitely in existence.  Fortunately “North Korea pursues nuclear weapons not for leverage but for the same reason that other highly vulnerable nations arm themselves- to deter an adversary” (Cha and Kang 21).  But even if the North develops nuclear weapons, the threat of a devastating U.S. response will likely prevent it from ever using them.  “Three out of four South Koreans believe that the United States does not take South Korean interests into account when making international decisions” (Stokes 2).   If the South Koreans feel that they cannot trust the government of the United States, then the antipathy that has developed in that country is fully justified.  North Korea is dealing with the United States Government pushing them to do what they don’t want to do.  However, if they don’t comply soon with at least some of the demands made on them, they will soon have to worry more about all of the U.S. troops in the DMZ.  Much compromise will be needed in order to bring this conflict out with a peaceful ending.  I feel that all of these countries need to understand that they must make mutual moves in order to bring this conflict to a close.  None of them will be willing to make any moves toward peace unless there is a flawless guarantee that the other countries involved will follow suit.  Once the United States government stops involving themselves in any business that is not necessary to our survival, they will be able to focus on what the country really needs and then can claim that they are working for the good of the people.

Works Cited

Cha, Victor D.  “The Korean Crisis.”  Foreign Policy 136 May/June 2003:  20-28

Kirk, Donald.  “Decoding North Korea.”  New Leader 86 Sept/Oct 2003: 9-11

Stokes, Bruce.  “Nuclear crisis tests U.S.-South Korean ties.”  National Journal 35 Sept.2003 (Source:  National journal. 35, no. 36, (2003): 2712 (3 pages))

Strobel, Warren P.  “Did CIA halt North Korean missile test?”  United States news World report 125 December 1998: 43

“Bush administration’s Korean Policy accused.”  Korean Central News Agency of DPRK 5 May 2003 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

“DPRK to Steadily Increase Its Nuclear Deterrent Force.”  Korean Central News Agency of DPRK 10 Sep. 2003 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

“KCNA Refutes U.S. Brigandish Demand.”  Korean Central News Agency of DPRK 12 Sep. 2003 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

“U.S. Blamed for Creating Nuclear Crisis.”  Korean Central News Agency of DPRK 18 Sep. 2003 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

“U.S. urged to make switchover in its DPRK policy.”  Korean Central News Agency of DPRK 5 May 2003 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

Weigley, Russell.  “American Master Strategy in Korea” http://mcel.pacificu.edu/as/students/stanley/weigley.html